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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the economics of green 
buildings: by merging auction theory and hedonic regression analysis we 
investigate the relationship between market concentration and price premiums in 
the American market for eco-certified real estate assets. Auction theory is used to 
model price formation where eco-investors may differ in their valuation of assets. 
Controlling for a large number of features, the empirical results provide evidence 
of a significant and positive relationship between investors’ eco-certified market 
share and prices of eco-certified space.  Contributing to the recent debate over 
the nature of the green premium, we find that eco-investors are creating clientele 
effects and that they may be subject to a green winner’s curse. 
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Research Highlights  
 
 A novel analysis on market concentration and price premiums for green 
buildings. 
 
 We find evidence of a “green winner’s curse”.  
 
 Investors with higher market share of eco-certified assets pay higher 
prices.  
 
 The “green winner’s curse” explains the widely observed price premium.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The increase in attention to “sustainable” or “green” building over the present decade has 
been remarkable. This reflects popular concern with environmental preservation, as well 
as changes in tastes among consumers and investors.  In the real estate sector, a blend of 
mandatory government regulation and voluntary industry standards has emerged in 
response to pressure to reduce the negative environmental impact of the building stock. 
There has been growing interest among real estate investors, developers, occupiers, as 
well as regulators and policy makers, in the effects of environmental certification on the 
financial performance of real estate assets. This has motivated, within the growing body 
of research focused on sustainability issues, a novel research strand specifically focused 
on certification-related pricing issues. 
 
In particular, a number of studies have found empirical evidence of financial benefits 
(see for example, Eichholtz, Kok, and Yonder (2012) on US, Devine and Kok (2015) on 
US and Canada, Deng and Wu (2013) on Singapore, Chegut, Eichholtz, and Kok (2014) 
on UK). Interestingly, the financial value of green buildings does not appear to be limited 
to operational costs: Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley (2013) and Reichardt (2014) find a 
premium for the sustainability certification that goes beyond reduced energy and 
operating expenses. Having said that, because green building certification allows for 
flexibility and does not entail specific technological requirements and because each type 
of green building or energy efficiency label is unique, some authors have referred to 
green certification as a “noisy” signal of building quality (see Fuerst and McAllister 
2011b and Kok, McGraw, and Quigley 2012).  
 
  To date, there has been virtually no theoretical research on the nature and causes of such 
certification premium. In this paper we take a natural first step to address this gap by 
focusing on the role that the price formation mechanism can play on investors’ behavior 
and on the resulting certification premium. We draw upon standard auction theory to 
develop a model of optimal bidding behavior for real estate assets; the model generates 
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theoretical estimates of the price premium associated with a given market share. Second, 
using a database of more than 2,700 commercial real estate transactions of Class A offices 
that took place between January 2007 and March 2012, we test the theoretical predictions 
of the model by employing hedonic regression analysis; in particular we examine whether 
eco-investors generally pay additional premiums for eco-certified assets.  
 
Our paper contributes to three different strands of the literature. Firstly, the existing 
literature on real estate auctions is small, especially on the theoretical side (the usually 
cited models are those of Quan (1994), Adams et al. 1992, Mayer 1995); our paper 
contributes to this literature by developing a simple model that gives clean theoretical 
predictions on the relationship between investor’s market share and paid price premium 
and that could be further applied to other auction-based markets. Secondly, the increasing 
attention to the environmental impact of commercial real estate has generated a 
developing body of empirical research that has focused on pricing and in particular on US 
commercial real estate assets; see, among others, Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley (2011, 
2013), Wiley, Benefield and Johnson (2010), Fuerst and McAllister (2011a, 2011b) and 
Miller, Spivey and Florance (2008). Following those contributions, we empirically 
investigate the eco-certification premium using the large Co-Star database
1
, but our novel 
contribution is to account for the investor’s market share as an explanatory variable of the 
observed price premium. By doing this, we find that investors with a higher market share 
of eco-certifies assets tend to pay higher prices, other things equal, therefore we find 
evidence of a green winner’s curse”.  Thirdly, in the market segmentation literature, there 
is a longstanding body of work suggesting that the size and nature of the investor base 
affects security prices. Most notably, explanations of the underperformance of Socially 
Responsible Investing (SRI) stocks have tended to focus on the impact of negative 
screening by SRI investors of ‘sin’ stocks: a decrease in the size of the investor base 
produces a neglect effect associated with exclusionary screening, lower demand for ‘sin’ 
securities, a negative effect on prices and a positive effect on returns. Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
1
 Our sample period 2007-2012 is larger than those of the cited papers and therefore we can draw comparisons with 
their results. It would be interesting to extend our sample period to more recent years, but access to more recent data was 
not available to us given our funding and the agreements with Co-Star.   
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growing body of work on the performance of SRI securitized funds has found mixed 
results; see, among others, Bauer et al (2005), Renneboog et al (2008a, 2008b), Nollet, 
Filis and Mitrokostas (2016) and Shen et al. (2016). In the same spirit of the last two 
cited papers, our work aims to better interpret the empirically observed non-linearity in 
the relationship between performance and SRI.  Interestingly for the existing literature  
on Real Estate eco-certifications and on Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), we obtain 
the novel result that a “green winner’s curse”, rather than buyer type effects or a REIT 
premium, explains the observed price premium for Energy Star certified Class A offices. 
 
Our findings can be broadly summarized as follows.  A perhaps surprising finding is 
that, in the high quality market segment, eco-certified office space has become part of the 
mainstream and is no longer a niche product.  Eco-certified office space has accounted 
for almost half of all Class A office space transacted since 2007. In addition, exploiting 
Co-Star data on investors’ market shares, we find evidence for the existence of eco-
investors (i.e. investors that are positively screening eco-certified office assets): a number 
of investors have only acquired eco-certified assets in the study period, while others have 
allocated the vast majority of the expenditure on Class A office to eco-certified offices. In 
line with previous hedonic studies, we find significant positive price premiums for some 
eco-certified office properties. However, this is only the case for space that is dual 
certified by LEED and Energy Star.  When market share is included as a control in the 
hedonic estimations, there is no significant price premium for LEED or Energy Star 
certified stock. Our interpretation of this finding is that higher bids by eco-investors are a 
significant determinant of the observed price premium for eco-certified space. Our 
analysis indicates that obtaining a higher market share entails that the investor pays a 
higher purchase price for each percent of additional market share and that the magnitude 
of this premium is considerably higher for eco-certified assets acquired by investors with 
a high market share of eco-certified Class A offices, thereby indicating evidence of a 
winner curse for eco-investors.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we discuss 
related research on the price effects of screening and of eco-certification in commercial 
real estate markets. Drawing upon auction theory, the subsequent section outlines a 
theoretical model of optimal bidding behavior and expected price effects. Data 
description and empirical analysis follow, together with detailed discussion of the 
econometric modeling and results.  Finally, conclusions are drawn.     
 
2. Background and Literature Review 
 
Typically, eco-certifications are awarded by a third party to products with a reduced 
environmental impact compared to a conventional product. In US commercial real estate 
markets, the two most common voluntary programs are LEED and Energy Star. The 
LEED Green Building Rating System, developed by the US Green Building Council, 
consists of a set of standards for the assessment of environmentally sustainable 
construction. A range of similar rating schemes have emerged in most advanced 
economies. Typically, the rating systems focus on six broad categories related to: 
sustainability of location, water efficiency, energy and atmosphere, materials and 
resources, indoor environmental quality and innovation and design process.  There are 
different levels of LEED accreditation based upon a scoring founded upon the six major 
categories listed above. In LEED 2009 for new construction and major renovations for 
commercial premises, buildings may qualify for four levels of certification: Certified, 
Silver, Gold and Platinum.  The Energy Star program tends to be more commonly used 
for existing buildings and is an assessment of buildings’ energy performance.  Energy 
Star accreditation reflects relative energy efficiency and environmental performance since 
only buildings that are in the top quartile of energy efficiency are eligible for Energy Star 
accreditation.  As our data will show, significant proportion of the buildings (and a larger 
proportion of space) is dual certified having an Energy Star certification in addition to 
LEED certification. Recent versions of LEED certification protocols require a minimum 
Energy Star rating, for example a rating of 65 for existing buildings applying for the 
LEED-EB label. 
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There is a growing body of evidence that occupiers of, and investors in, buildings with 
better environmental performance can obtain a range of benefits.  Owners, developers 
and/or occupiers can benefit from subsidies, tax reliefs and reduced regulatory barriers 
that have been offered in many jurisdictions. In addition to the above, the other 
significant tangible benefit to occupiers is lower utility costs regarding energy and water 
use. More difficult to measure benefits tend to be associated with productivity 
improvements (lower staff turnover, absenteeism, higher outputs inter alia), reduced 
obsolescence, lower regulatory risks and reputational rewards. Kats (2003), Singh et al. 
(2010), and Turban and Greening (1997) are among those showing that enhanced 
performance can come from energy efficiency, water efficiency, higher-quality outputs, 
and improved employee productivity (and retention and recruiting). Green buildings may 
provide other benefits to their owners, including serving as a hedge against climate, 
regulatory, or other environmental risks. See, for example, Jackson (2010), Deng, Li, and 
Quigley (2012), Kahn and Kok (2014), Kahn, Kok, and Quigley (2014). 
  
Advantages for investors and developers tend to fall into similar categories. The green 
building literature has investigated geographical diffusion (see Fuerst, 2009; Choi, 2010; 
Kok, McGraw and Quigley, 2011, 2012), benefits for different types of occupiers (see 
Fuerst and McAllister, 2009; Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley, 2009) and referred to building 
buyers, tenants, and employees (Singh et al. 2010) as well as the owning firm’s customers 
and investors (Eichholtz, Kok and Yonder 2012; Chegut, Eichholtz and Kok 2014) as 
being stakeholders who might value the green building signal. The policies towards the 
certification of green building can therefore be understood as an effort to better align the 
private costs of buildings with their social costs, where the certification process can 
verify difficult-to-observe improvements to building performance and its footprint, which 
might include energy efficiency, indoor air quality, or construction processes; see, among 
others, Kotchen (2006), Potoski and Prakash (2009), Fuerst, Kontokosta, and McAllister 
(2014), see also Brounen and Kok (2011) and Bond and Devine (2016a, 2016b) for 
related research on the role played by eco-certifications in the residential sector.  
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As already mentioned in the introduction, price premiums could potentially offset some 
of these benefits, but due to problems of data availability the performance of investors 
who pay these price premiums has not been evaluated by the previous research; our paper 
takes a first step in this direction. Implicit in the research question addressed in this paper 
is an assumption that investor demand affects prices.  Under the efficient markets 
hypothesis, investor demand should not matter since prices encapsulate the present value 
of the cash flow generated by the asset and  given this horizontal demand curve 
assumption, investors can buy or sell any amount of a security without affecting its price.  
However, while in an efficient market clientele effects should not exist, there are 
numerous studies on securities markets demonstrating that they do. In commercial real 
estate markets, it is almost axiomatic that deviations from perfect market assumptions are 
substantially larger. Thin trading, high search costs, information asymmetries, 
heterogeneous assets and expectations all increase potential clientele effects.  Indeed, 
segmentation is also often highlighted between investor types.  Short-hand clientele 
investor categories such as institution/non-institutional and core/value/opportunistic 
reflect variations in risk preferences amongst investor groups;  indeed, assets are also 
classified in the same way. 
   
  There has been limited work on clientele effects in commercial real estate markets.  
Benjamin et al. (2008) found little evidence of a persistent premium for Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs) over time finding evidence of an effect in a small number of 
years; research by Hardin and Wolverton (1999), Lambson, McQueen and Slade (2004) 
and - drawing upon a much larger sample of transactions - Ling and Petrova (2010) find 
evidence that tax-motivated, out-of-state and REITs buyers pay significantly more than 
in-state buyers.  Akin et al. (2013) looked at similar issues using more robust repeat-sales 
methods.  An issue with this body of work is the tendency to simply classify buyers into 
REIT and non-REIT buyers.  For Class A investment assets, in addition to long 
established institutional investors such as occupational pension funds and insurance 
companies, REITs must compete with other types of real estate investment organisations 
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who have become increasingly prominent. Sovereign wealth funds, specialist open and 
closed end real estate funds, investment banks, specialist real estate investment managers, 
private equity groups and endowment funds have emerged as significant market 
participants with a number of these organisations creating significant operational 
platforms to execute real estate investment strategies. Whilst the premium price, or 
premium property, conundrum can be difficult to resolve, there are a priori reasons to 
expect clientele effects for eco-certified real estate assets.  As widely argued by the cited 
literature, these may be motivated either by a “green glow” benefit, or expected higher 
investment performance of eco-certified assets or a blend of both.  Hence, market 
segmentation may occur as eco-certified and non-certified assets are no longer perfect 
substitutes for a group of investors. As mentioned in the introduction, our specific 
contribution to the debate over REIT premium is to show that, in the market for eco-
certified assets, the REIT premium can be interpreted as the clientele effect of eco-
investors. In the next section, we set out the theoretical model in order to obtain 
theoretical predictions on the relationship between market concentration and asset prices. 
The theoretical predictions will then be tested in the subsequent econometric analysis.  
 
 
3. Theoretical Model 
 
  We model a setting in which different investors bid competitively in a first-price sealed 
auction, which previous research shows to be a widely used method of institutional-grade 
commercial real estate disposal/acquisition in the US.
2
 As standard in the auction 
literature, we assume rational agents and obtain the investors’ optimal bidding strategies 
through the concept of Nash Equilibrium.  As discussed in the introduction, the value of 
eco-certified buildings may entail both a private dimension and a common one. We 
model these two dimensions in a simplified manner.  We assume that different investors 
                                                 
2
 An alternative type of selling mechanism could be a sequential auction, where investors can bid repeatedly for the 
same asset. Under the assumption of our model that the same group of investors bid for a number of assets, our main 
theoretical predictions would apply to that case as well.  
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agree on the expected cash flows generated by the asset, but discount the cash flows at 
different discount rates. The fact that different investors have homogenous expectations 
about the future cash flows captures the dimension of the value of the asset that is 
common.  The fact that different investors discount the cash flows at different rates 
reflects differences in cost of capital, risk and time preferences among investors, 
implying that their private appraisal of an asset’s investment value may differ. 
 
Specifically, we model a large number of investors bidding for a real estate asset. 
Investors agree on an expected cash flow C generated by the asset but have different 
private discount rates ri.
3
 We assume that investors do not know exactly the private 
discount rate of their competitors but are correct about its distribution. We assume a 
uniform distribution of discount rates in order to simplify the analysis. Using a perpetuity 
formula, as standard in real estate valuation, we obtain the private value that each 
investor gives to the asset 
 
𝑣𝑖 = 𝐶/𝑟𝑖.         (1) 
 
We define max(v) as the maximum common value that any investor i would be willing 
to pay for the asset - in other words the value obtained when the discount rate equals the 
internal rate of return  (irr), such that an investor paying max(v) for the asset makes zero 
profit, hence: 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑣 ) = 𝐶/𝑖𝑟𝑟.       (2) 
  
Dividing vi by max(v) we obtain the normalized private value and we label it wi , where 
 
𝑤𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖/𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑣𝑖)       (3) 
 
                                                 
3
 It is a standard assumption in the real estate literature that investors value assets given different discount rates. In our 
case, this is the simplest modelling strategy in order to model investors that have different private values for the contended 
assets.  
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and wi is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Given this normalization, we can 
model a first-price auction where each investor bids for the asset given a private value 
between 0 and 1, where private values are uniformly distributed.      
 
Through standard results in auction theory (see for example Matthews (1995)) we 
obtain the optimal individual bid bi in a Nash Equilibrium: 
 
𝑏𝑖 = (
𝑁−1
𝑁
) 𝑤𝑖 .       (4) 
 
According to (4), investors find optimal to bid less than their private value, but as the 
number of competitors increases, individual bids become closer to private values. 
 
We are interested in analyzing a setting where investors bid for a number of assets over 
a number of years and understanding how optimal individual bids may translate into 
higher numbers of wins for some investors leading to market concentration.  For the rest 
of the analysis, we assume that the observed market share of one investor equals the 
probability of being the highest bidder in an auction. This assumption holds true if the 
same set of investors bids for a given number of buildings, which fits our empirical case 
of institutional investors in Class A offices. 
 
Referring to Matthews (1995), the probability of being the investor with highest private 
value w1 is given by the following expression 
 
𝑓(𝑤1) = 𝑁𝑤
𝑁−1.       (5) 
 
Considering that the individual investor’s market share equals the probability of being the 
investor with the highest bid, i.e. with the highest private value, we define the market 
share of an investor i as MSi = f(w1=wi ). From (5) we obtain that 
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𝑤𝑖 = (
𝑀𝑆𝑖
𝑁
)
1
𝑁−1
.       (6) 
 
Expression (6) implies that from the observed market share of an investor, we can 
recover the private value and, more precisely, the discount rate of this investor. Re-
expressing (6) through (1) and (2) we obtain: 
 
𝑖𝑟𝑟
𝑟𝑖
= (
𝑀𝑆𝑖
𝑁
)
1
𝑁−1
.       (7) 
 
Expression (7) implies that the lower is the discount rate ri of an investor and the 
higher the investor can afford to bid, hence the higher is the investor’s market share. The 
incentive for an investor to be a frequent winner and therefore to gain a substantial 
market share is given by the difference between the private value (3) and the implied bid 
(4). We define this difference the private gain of an investor. It is immediate to verify that 
the private gain equals to 
 
𝑤𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖 =
1
𝑁
(
𝑀𝑆𝑖
𝑁
)
1
𝑁−1
.       (8) 
  
We verify that at any given market share MSi, the private gain decreases as the number 
of competitors N increases, because the more competitive is the auction and the closer to 
the private value one has to bid to maintain a given market share. 
 
We also notice that, fixing the number of competitors N, the private gain increases with 
the market share. This is because the higher is the private value wi  - hence the market 
share by expression (6) – and the less close to the private value one has to bid in order to 
win, as suggested by expression (4).   
We also investigate an alternative notion of investors’ gain, namely the percentage 
difference between the (normalized) maximum common value and the individual bid (1 - 
bi)/1. We define this difference as the market gain of an investor. Since max(v) is defined 
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as the asset price such that an investor would make null profit, the market gain is a 
measure of the return on the investment, given a value max(v) that is agreed by the 
market participants. Re-expressing (4) through (1) and (2), we obtain that 
 
𝑏𝑖 =
(𝑁−1)𝑖𝑟𝑟
𝑁𝑟𝑖
.        (9) 
 
We notice that expression (9) increases in the ratio irr/ri, because the lower is the 
discount rate ri, and the higher the investor can afford to bid. As already noted, this also 
implies through (7) that the lower is the discount rate ri and the more often the investor 
wins, hence the higher is the market share. We also notice that, as the individual bid 
increases with the market share, the higher is the individual market share and the closer to 
the maximum common value is, on average, the price at which the investor buys the asset 
(the winning bid). This implies that the investor’s market gain decreases with the market 
share, i.e. a winner’s curse. 
 
Summarizing, our theoretical framework shows that, if investors bid rationally, 
investors that win more often than others do so, on average, because they can afford to 
bid higher. This different private element is captured by the heterogeneous discount 
factor, which may broadly proxy for different economic factors, for example different 
costs of capital or different risk preferences. In addition, our theoretical results show that 
investors who bid higher and win more often make, on average, a lower rate of return 
(measured as the extra percentage on the zero profit rate) on the single asset, with respect 
to investors that win less often but pay lower prices.   
 
Numerical simulations  
 
We analyze the numerical predictions of our theoretical model for the case of 15 
investors N=15. This will be shown to be the number of strategic players suggested by 
the results in the empirical section. Figure 1 shows how an investor’s private value wi and 
winning bid bi, computed by (6) and (4), vary with the market share. Given the theoretical 
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set-up, bi should be interpreted as the expected or average winning bid of an investor, 
given her market share. The numerical results show that an investor with a 1% market 
share is bidding approximately 55% of the maximum common value, while an investor 
with a 5% market share is bidding approximately 62% of the maximum common value. 
 
Figure 1: Private values and winning bids 
Despite the concave behavior shown in Figure 1, we verify that a percentage increase in 
the market share implies a constant percentage increase in the winning bid. Figure 2 
shows, by plotting the winning bid bi against percentage increases in the market share, 
that the elasticity of the winning bid with respect to the market share, for the case of 
N=15 (which will be the number of strategic investors justified by our empirical results), 
is constant and equal to 0.07%. 
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Figure 2: Elasticity of the winning bid, with respect to the market share 
 
Figure 3 shows how the difference between an investor’s private value wi and winning 
bid bi, namely the private gain, changes with the market share, as computed by (8). The 
numerical results show that the private gain does not vary significantly for different 
market shares.  Therefore, according to the model it does not appear that, given their 
private value (which can be interpreted as a reservation price), investors that win less 
often pay significantly less.   
60.00%
61.00%
62.00%
63.00%
64.00%
65.00%
66.00%
67.00%
68.00%
69.00%
70.00%
V
al
u
e
s,
 f
ro
m
 0
 t
o
 1
 
Winning Bid
Market Share, 
 percentage increases 
16 
 
 
Figure 3: Winner’s private gain 
 
Figure 4 shows how the difference between 1 (the normalized maximum common value) 
and an investors’ winning bid bi, namely the market gain, changes with the market share, 
as computed by (4) and (6). Consistently with figure 1, figure 4 shows that an investor 
with a 1% market share is paying approximately 45% less than the maximum common 
value for the asset, while an investor with a 5% market share is paying 38% less than the 
maximum common value. We also notice that an increase above 20% of the market share 
has only a very small effect on the market gain.   Figure 4 shows also how the ratio ri/irr 
varies with the market share of an investor, as obtained by (7). The numerical results 
show that the private value of an investor with a 1% market share is obtained by 
discounting cash flows at a rate equal to the 68% of the irr, while the private value of an 
investor with a 5% market share is obtained by discounting cash flows at a lower rate 
equal to the 50% of the irr. We also notice that the ratio ri/irr varies significantly with 
increases above 20% of the market share and eventually converges to the market gain. 
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Figure 4: Market gain and discount factor 
 
Testable implications  
 
The focus of our empirical exercise is to identify the determinants of the price paid for 
eco-certified buildings. Is it the case that investors in eco-certified buildings 
systematically over-pay for their assets? If yes, is this due to strategic bidding in an 
auction setting? Those are the questions that we address.  
 
In our empirical analysis, we observe the price paid, i.e. the winning bid, and we 
explain this price with a hedonic model. We interpret the price difference between two 
buildings with the same hedonic features as a premium. Our theoretical model predicts 
that, other things equal, an increase in market share increases the winning bid and 
therefore the price premium. This can be easily seen by plugging (7) into (9) as we obtain 
that 
 
𝑏𝑖 =
(𝑁−1)
𝑁
(
𝑀𝑆𝑖
𝑁
)
1
𝑁−1
 .     (10) 
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Since our empirical hedonic model will control for the features of the building, the first 
testable implication of our model is that the price premium increases with the market 
share. Specifically, the empirical model will give a result in terms of elasticity and will 
predict, as shown by Figure 2, that an increase of 1% in the market share is associated to 
a 0.07% increase in the price premium, leading us to believe that N=15 players is a good 
approximation of the number of strategic players in commercial real estate auctions. The 
second prediction that can be inferred by (10) is that the higher is the number of 
competitors N and the lower is the marginal impact of the market share on the price 
premium, since the probability of winning by placing strategically optimal bids is lower. 
We empirically test those predictions in the following sections. 
 
 
4. Data 
 
  The empirical analysis draws on CoStar's comprehensive national commercial real 
estate database which includes approximately 43 billion square feet of commercial space 
in more than two million properties making it the largest available real estate database in 
the United States.  For researchers, it has become an increasingly important source of 
data on real estate assets and transactions.  In total, we have collected information on just 
over 3000 transactions of which 2,734 were usable. This dataset comprises all recorded 
sales of Class A office buildings where prices are in the data set in the five-year period 
from Q1 2007 through Q1 2012.     
 
The summary statistics are displayed in Table 1. There are clearly some differences 
between eco-certified and non-certified Class A office buildings.  LEED certified offices 
tend to be newer - the median age of LEED certified offices is five years.  The 
comparable figure for the non-certified offices is 22.  While there is relatively little 
difference between buildings with Energy Star label, dual certified and the non-certified 
sample in terms of age, the former tend to be dominated by tall buildings suggesting that 
they are mainly located in CBD locations.  This is supported by the fact that Energy Star 
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and dual certified also tend to be much larger than non-certified offices buildings.  Whilst 
there is little difference in occupancy rates, without controlling for the differences 
between the samples, median sale prices are substantially higher for eco-certified offices.    
However, compared to previous studies the pattern for LEED offices seems to have  
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
   Summary Statistics             
  Non-certified Price ($psf) Stories Size (sq ft) Age (yrs)  % Leased   
  
      
  
  Mean 224 7.3 171,918 22.9 84.8   
  Median 184 4.0 115,000 23.0 92.3   
  Standard deviation 171 8.2 225,302 18.3 20   
  Observations 1863 1863 1863 1863 1863   
  
      
  
  Energy Star certified Price ($psf) Stories Size (sq ft) Age (yrs)  % Leased   
  
      
  
  Mean 277 13.2 311,230 26.7 85.7   
  Median 236 9.0 207,549 25.0 90.1   
  Standard deviation 162 11.7 309,092 17.5 14.7   
  Observations 537 537 537 537 537   
  
      
  
  LEED certified Price ($psf) Stories Size (sq ft) Age (yrs)  % Leased   
  
      
  
  Mean 304 8.8 247,903 14.4 90.6   
  Median 260 6.0 183,657 5.0 99.2   
  Standard deviation 186 8.4 297,701 19.8 16.1   
  Observations 88 88 88 88 88   
  
      
  
  Dual certified Price ($psf) Stories Size (sq ft) Age (yrs)  % Leased   
  
      
  
  Mean 344 19.7 465,447 23.8 87.3   
  Median 312 15.0 334,794 23.0 91.0   
  Standard deviation 164 15.4 378,529 17.7 15.7   
  Observations 246 246 246 246 246   
                
 
changed substantially.  Confirming previous research, dual certified offices seem to 
comprise mainly of prestige offices.  Compared even to LEED and Energy Star, typically 
they sell for more and are larger and taller. 
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The names of buyers were provided with each transaction.  A range of categories of 
buyers were specified by the research team.  These included; insurance group, investment 
bank, major financial services group, pension fund, private equity group, private real 
estate company, REIT and specialist real estate asset manager.  Buyers that had purchased 
less than five assets in the sample were labelled ‘low volume buyers’ and not categorised.  
Categorization was largely based upon an analysis of the content of the web site of the 
organization.  We would acknowledge that a number of organizations offered a range of 
real estate-related activities and categorization was not always straightforward. It is also 
possible that for a proportion of single asset buyers were special purpose vehicles owned 
by a large-scale real estate investors set up specifically to acquire and hold the asset.   
  
The breakdown of the buyers of Class A office investments indicates the changing nature 
of the real estate investment markets with the emergence of private investment 
organisations and the relative decline of traditional investing institutions such as pension 
funds and insurance companies.  Of a total of 2,734 usable transactions, over 58% 
involved low volume real estate buyers.  As noted above, this category consisted of  
buyers that had a market share
4
 of less than 0.15% in that they had acquired four or fewer 
assets out of the total of 2,734.  Collectively, insurance companies, investment banks, 
pension funds and major financial services groups who had purchased five or more assets 
accounted for just over 3% of all transactions.  Specialist real estate asset managers 
(11.8%) and REITs (18.8%) were the biggest categories of large-scale investors.   Private 
equity groups (3.5%) and private real estate companies (6.1%) were also significant 
large-scale investors.   
 
Figure 5 provides a breakdown of the transaction volumes for eco-certified and non-
certified Class A office space over the period.  Not surprisingly, associated with the 
financial crisis, the dominant structural pattern is a sharp fall in transaction volumes after 
2007 for both eco-certified and non-certified offices.  While this is followed by an upturn 
                                                 
4
 We define market share as the number of transactions as a proportion of total transactions in the US Class A office 
market. 
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in transaction volumes in 2010 and 2011, the levels of 2007 are not achieved again.   In 
2007, eco-certified Class A office space accounted for nearly 50% of all transacted Class 
A office space.  In 2011, the comparable figure was approximately 43%.  When the data 
is disaggregated in the three main categories, it is clear that in terms of floor space 
Energy Star certified office space has accounted for nearly 57% of eco-certified Class A 
office space.  A substantial proportion of the remainder (36%) is accounted for by dual 
certified office space.  This increases in 2011 to account for over 41% of all Class A eco-
certified office space transacted.  Offices with only the LEED certification are the 
smallest segment.  In 2007, they accounted for around 3% of all eco-certified space 
transacted.  After 2007, this figure increased to approximately over 13%.  Given the 
relatively low level of trading in LEED-only certified Class A office space especially 
regarding the number of properties transacted, it is unlikely that significant 
concentrations of buyers will be identified.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Sale Volumes and Prices for US Class A Offices 2007-2012 
 
Given that there is no commonly recognized definition of ‘eco-investors’, we use a 
number of criteria to identify investors that have acquired large amounts of eco-certified 
Class A office space compared to non-certified Class A office space.  Given the fact that 
Energy Star and dual certified offices are more likely to be large assets, it is possible that 
the inherently ‘lumpy’ nature of real estate investment may mean that investors are mis-
identified as eco-investors e.g. an investor who buys a single large, incidentally (from the 
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investor’s perspective) eco-certified, trophy asset may appear to be an eco-investor.  As a 
result, we select investors who have purchased large amounts of eco-certified office space 
both in absolute and relative terms. The definition of an ‘eco-investor’ used in this 
analysis is based on the share of eco-certified properties an investment company acquires 
in relation to all properties they acquired during the study period 2007-2012. If at least 
half of the office space acquired by an investor is eco-certified, we consider this investor 
an eco-investor. To avoid spurious inference caused by low volume buyers buying a small 
number of Class A office properties that happen to be eco-certified, we impose a 
minimum condition of three eco-certified properties acquired in the 2007-12 period in 
order for an investor to be included in this category. 
 
  Figure 6 illustrates the association between an investor’s market share in the eco-
certified Class A office investment market and the total Class A office investment market. 
Companies above the regression line are eco-investors with a higher market share in the 
eco-certified market than their total market share would suggest. Conversely, companies 
below the line are investing less in the eco-certified market than their position in the 
overall market would suggest. As expected, market concentration in the overall market is 
lower than it is in the smaller market for eco-certified buildings. The regression line and 
the scaling of the two axes take these general differences in market shares into account. 
Using this simple graph, a group of relatively large eco-investors emerges along or above 
the regression line with the three largest eco-investors (Beacon Capital, Hines and JP 
Morgan Chase) in the left upper quadrant forming a distinct sub-group.  
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Figure 6: Total Market Share vs. ‘Green’ Market Share (as of March 2012) 
 
The group of eco-investors that we identified using the criteria described above accounts 
for a significant share of purchases of eco-certified properties. This group bought 41% 
(218 million sq. ft.) of all Energy Star, LEED or dual certified Class A office properties 
but only 12% (54 million sq. ft.) of non-certified Class A office assets. Figure 7 confirms 
this trend by showing the cumulative annual acquisitions of the Top 20 among eco-
investors. Perhaps not surprisingly, eco-investors’ commitment of capital to eco-certified 
assets, in particular to dual-certified assets, has outpaced their purchases of non-certified 
assets by far. Nevertheless, this finding is important in that it confirms that the largest 
buyers of eco-certified assets are not simply “accidental eco-investors”, i.e. big overall 
buyers in the institutional-grade office market but rather a distinct group of large 
investors predominantly targeting  eco-certified assets.  
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Figure 7: Cumulative square footage of Class A office space acquired by Top 20 Eco-Investors by type 
of certification 
 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
 
We use a standard hedonic framework in our study primarily to isolate the effect of the 
main price determinants – size, age, location, vacancy rate, buyer type, time of sale etc. 
Rosen's (1974) full specification of the hedonic method is a two-stage process where the 
first stage estimates the hedonic price function by regressing the transaction price on a 
number of price determinants. In the second stage, the marginal willingness-to-pay 
parameters are recovered from the implicit price function estimated in the first stage, 
taking into account the buyer's budget constraints and utility level. These can be 
estimated by using the marginal price of the first stage in this model. The second stage is 
inherently more difficult to estimate and prone to bias and misspecification problems. 
This has led many researchers in more recent studies to use a single-stage reduced form 
model.  
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Our empirical strategy is to quantify the effects of environmental certification on sale 
prices, initially without considering the effects of auctions and bids, by using indicator 
variables that capture whether a building has an Energy Star, LEED label or both.  A 
positive coefficient of these variables is expected indicating that, on average, 
environmentally certified offices sell for higher prices than non-certified offices.  In 
addition to mitigating the effects of extreme values, the log-log specification of the 
hedonic model allows us to interpret the coefficients in terms of average percentage 
premiums. A summary specification of our model is then:  
 
ln 𝑃 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1 ln 𝐴 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑅 + 𝛽3 ln 𝑋 + 𝛽4𝐵 + 𝜕𝑇 + 𝜑𝑆 + 𝜔𝐺 + 𝜕𝑁 𝜔𝐺 + 𝜕𝑁+ε (12) 
 
 
Where the transaction price per square foot of rentable office space on natural log scale is 
estimated as a function of building age (A), years since last major refurbishment (R) as 
well as a vector of physical characteristics (X) that includes, among others, building 
height and total square footage, (B) are buyer characteristics such as type of investment 
vehicle and company size.  We have investor type – but not vehicle or company size – is 
this a cut and paste problem? T is a set of quarterly time dummy variables and S is a set 
of office submarket dummy variables. The parameters 𝛽𝑖represent the constant elasticity 
of price with respect to each hedonic characteristic. The key variables 𝜔 and 𝜕 are the 
market shares of each buyer in the ‘green’ and the ‘non-green’ market respectively. To 
estimate the impact of market share on the price paid, we interact these variables with the 
dummy variables G and N which indicate an eco-certified and non eco-certified building 
respectively. In line with our theoretical exposition, we expect a positive and significant 
parameter estimate for the interaction term 𝜔𝐺. 
 
It is notable that few previous studies have identified a separate category of offices that 
had dual certification from Energy Star and LEED.  This is a potentially significant 
limitation. In our sample, Energy Star certified space accounts for 56% of total certified 
space, the LEED label for 7% and dual certified buildings account for the remaining 
36%.  Fuerst and McAllister (2011a) discuss the potential omitted variable problem that 
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may result.  They suggest that failure to include an interaction term or separate indicator 
variable for dual certified assets produces a negative bias in the estimates of the price 
effects of the individual eco-certificates. In the present analysis, we code dual 
certification as a separate variable, rather than applying a multiplicative interaction term, 
mainly to avoid collinearity problems. 
 
To reduce any potential omitted variable bias - the ‘premium property effect’ identified in 
studies of REIT acquisition prices - we include a number of variables often associated 
with high quality, prestigious office buildings. It is possible that eco-certification price 
effects are in part due to the effects of other (unobserved) building attributes such as 
design quality, internal specification, facilities. Variables included in the hedonic 
specification are the presence of a fitness center, atrium, food services, signage inter alia.  
In addition, the use of submarkets as the location, the inclusion of distance from transit 
stations and the control for age, height and size of office should also control for the 
possibility that eco-certified offices may be more likely to be ‘best-in-class’.  While it is 
possible that eco-certified offices may have better quality tenants on leases that are 
attractive for the investor, these attributes may ultimately be related to eco-certification.  
 
 
6. Results 
 
  The hedonic framework allows us to control for systematic differences between the eco-
certified sample and the overall sample. It also allows us to control for the sub-samples 
acquired by eco-investors. Table 1 shows summary statistics and variable definitions. It is 
clear that the characteristics of the average eco-certified building are different from the 
overall sample. In particular, as noted above, eco-certified offices tend to be larger and 
taller.   Detailed results for all model specifications can be found in Table 2. The 
estimated coefficients on the control variables are generally of the predicted sign and 
remain consistent across a range of model specifications. For example, the estimated 
coefficient on age and period since refurbishment is negative and statistically significant 
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in line with our expectations.  In line with previous studies, there is a positive relationship 
between price and height of the building (number of stories). As expected, there is also a 
significant positive relationship between plot area and price.  Not surprisingly, there is a 
strong positive effect of occupancy rate on sale price per square foot.  Some of the 
variables associated with prestige buildings tend to have the expected coefficients.  All 
else equal, named buildings tend to sell at a premium of approximately 7%.  The presence 
of food services also tends to have positive price effect of approximately 6%.    Not 
surprisingly, all else equal, the distance from a transit station has a negative effect on sale 
price.    
 
  Turning to the variables of interest, Model 1 estimates that eco-certified buildings sell at 
a premium of approximately 5% relative to non-certified buildings.  It is notable that 
there is a strongly significant positive relationship between the investors’ market share 
and the prices paid. This is consistent with large-scale investors in Class A office space 
paying higher prices in order to win bidding ‘contests’ for real estate assets. We then 
perform a number of robustness checks through different models’ specifications. As we 
will describe in the remainder of this section, the estimated effect of investor market 
share remains consistent and significant in all models. More specifically, the empirical 
result of models 1, 2 and 4 that the price elasticity with respect to the market share equals 
0.07% can be rationalized by the numerical results of the theoretical model with 15 
strategic bidders. 
   
  In Model 2, we investigate the extent to which premiums vary with type of eco-
certificate and find some surprising results. LEED-only assets account for a relatively 
small proportion of total eco-certified Class A stock transacted and we find no 
statistically significant price effect for this type of certification.  The estimated price 
premium for Energy Star certification is also statistically insignificant.  This is an 
unexpected finding since previous studies
5
 have found a significant positive price effect 
                                                 
5
 Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley (2011), Wiley, Benefield and Johnson (2010), Fuerst and McAllister (2011a, 2011b) and 
Miller, Spivey and Florance (2008). 
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for Energy Star certified offices; the reason for our novel result is that, differently from 
the previous studies, we control for the investors’ market share. Those results lead us to 
think that it is the investor’s market share to be driving the observed certification 
premiums.  
  
Robustness Checks. 
 
  In order to more robustly check the extent to which eco-certification premiums are 
being affected by market share rather than eco-certification effects, we omit market share 
as a control variable in Model 3 whilst retaining the same specification.   We find that the 
estimated price premiums increase and that the Energy Star price premium is 
significantly positive at around 9%. Our interpretation of these findings is that bids by 
eco-investors are a significant determinant of the price premium for eco-certified space. 
In order to control for potential effects of buyer type, Model 4 includes dummy variables 
representing the different categories of investing organizations discussed above.  The 
results remain broadly the same as Models 1 and 2.  Most relevantly, again there is no 
statistically significant price premium for LEED or Energy Star certified Class A office 
investments.  However, a price premium of 8% is estimated for dual certified Class A 
office investments.  It is striking that there are no significant buyer-type effects.  In 
particular, it is notable that there is no evidence to suggest that, all else equal, REIT 
buyers pay a price premium compared to other investing organizations.  
    
  In line with the theoretical model, we also expect that investors who acquired relatively 
high proportions of eco-certified stock will tend to have paid higher prices.  In Model 4 
we estimate the price effects of interacting asset certification (eco-certified or non-
certified) and investors’ market share of eco-certified and non-eco-certified Class A office 
transactions.  The model estimates for the control variables are broadly similar to the 
previous models and again there is no significant price effect of buyer type.  With regard 
to the effects of market share on price, the results are broadly consistent with 
expectations.  There is a significant positive effect of market share of eco-certified of 
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Class A offices on the price of eco-certified Class A office space.  Essentially, the result 
suggests that the larger investors’ market share of eco-certified Class A office space, the 
higher the price that they have paid.  There is also a significant positive effect of market 
share of eco-certified of Class A offices on the price of non-certified Class A office space.  
However, the size of the effect is smaller.  The fact that there is no significant relationship 
between market share of non-certified Class A office space and the price of eco-certified 
space is also consistent with eco-investors paying more for eco-certified space.  Further 
support is provided by the fact that there is a significant positive effect of market share of 
non-certified Class A office space on the price of non-certified space – albeit  that the size 
of the effect is much smaller compared to the effect of market share of eco-certified space 
on the price of eco-certified Class A office space.  
 
  The results support the theoretical prediction that an increase in the market share is 
associated with an increase in the price paid for an asset. More specifically, the empirical 
result of models 1, 2 and 4 that the price elasticity with respect to the market share equals 
0.07% can be rationalized by the numerical results of the theoretical model with 15 
strategic bidders. Moreover, the prediction of the theoretical model that a higher number 
of players reduces the marginal impact of the market share on the winning bid offers us 
an interpretation for the lower values of the price elasticity with respect to the market 
share in model 5, leading us to think that auctions for conventional buildings may be 
characterized by a higher number of potential bidders. 
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Table 2:  Results of Hedonic Modelling, Dependent Variable: (Log) Price$ psf 
Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Eco-certified 0.047*     
LEED certified  0.026 0.047 0.036  
Energy Star certified 0.039 0.094*** 0.038  
Dual certified  0.087* 0.146*** 0.081*  
      
Named building 0.067** 0.067** 0.080** 0.067** 0.070** 
Office Park 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.100*** 0.075*** 0.084*** 
Atrium -0.041 -0.044 -0.052* -0.043 -0.046 
Corner lot 0.025 0.025 0.10 0.024 0.022 
Restaurant 0.026 0.024 0.039 0.024 0.030 
Signage 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.009 
Fitness center 0.041 0.040 0.049* 0.040 0.047* 
Food services 0.060* 0.061** 0.050* 0.060* 0.062** 
Bus line -0.060* -.0.060* -0.066* -0.061* -0.070* 
Walk to transit -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.066* -0.067*** -0.070*** 
Street level retail -0.033 -0.033 -0.042 -0.033 -0.042 
Part of mall 0.133 0.130 0.175 0.131 0.16 
Age (squared) -0.041*** -0.044*** -0.041*** -0.043*** 0.040*** 
Years since refurb (squared) -0.008* -0.008* -0.007* -0.008* -0.008* 
Number of stories 0.074* 0.073* 0.081** 0.073* 0.071* 
Total rentable floorspace -0.072* -0.073** -0.001 -0.072* -0.028 
Land area 0.031* 0.031* 0.038* 0.032* 0.034* 
Occupancy rate 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.182*** 0.178*** 0.179*** 
      
Insurance company    Hold-out Hold-out 
Investment bank    -0.137 -0.031 
Low volume investor    -0.030 -0.071 
Major financial services group     0.087 0.140 
Pension fund   0.107 0.161 
Private equity group    -0.022 0.029 
Private real estate company    0.007 0.046 
REIT    -0.002 0.084 
Specialist real estate asset manager    -0.046 0.039 
 
(Log) Investor Market Share 
 
0.077*** 
 
0.076*** 
  
0.074*** 
 
(Log) Green market share and green building interaction    0.021* 
(Log) Green market share and conventional building 
interaction 
   0.011*** 
(Log) Conventional market share and green building interaction   -0.003 
(Log) Conventional market share and conventional building interaction   0.005** 
 
Constant 
 
6.476*** 
 
6.500*** 
 
4.888*** 
 
6.492*** 
 
5.59*** 
      
Quarterly fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Submarket fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2734 2734 2734 2734 2734 
R2 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.67 
adj. R2 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.62 0.62 
AIC 3416.6 3418.4 3590.9 3426.8 3461.5 
BIC 5297.1 5310.7 5477.3 5366.4 5401.1 
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001   
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7. Conclusions 
   
  The aims of the research were to investigate patterns of buying behavior in eco-certified 
Class A offices and to evaluate the effect of potential SRI-type screening on pricing.  It is 
clear from this analysis that, in the Class A office market segment, eco-certified space has 
become part of the mainstream and is not a niche product in the Class A office sector.  
Eco-certified office space accounted for almost half of all Class A office space transacted 
between 2007 and 2012. The vast majority of this space comprises offices that are 
Energy Star or Energy Star and LEED certified.  Offices with LEED-only certification 
have accounted for less than 10% of all Class A eco-certified stock that has been 
transacted.  There is also evidence that some investors are positively screening eco-
certified office assets.  A number of investors have only acquired eco-certified assets in 
the study period: others have allocated the vast majority of the expenditure on Class A 
office to eco-certified offices.  Providing support for the presence of a group of eco-
investors in commercial real estate markets, the outcome has been that some investors 
have relatively high market shares for this type of stock. 
 
  A niggling doubt of previous research on green building premiums is that there is a 
positive relationship between the presence of eco-investors, eco-certification and the 
relative quality of assets within a broad quality band such as Class A offices.  Put simply, 
assets that are eco-certified and/or purchased by eco-investors may be above average 
quality assets within their class.  This problem has been analyzed in some detail by Atkin 
et al (2013) in the context of the price effect of REIT buyers.  The possible outcome is 
that the price effects of unobserved quality factors are being misattributed as an eco-
certification effect.  In contrast to previous research, a striking finding of this research is 
that buyer type is not a significant price determinant.  In particular, we find no evidence 
of a REIT premium.  Our results suggest that, perhaps not surprisingly, there is a ‘market 
share premium’ in that Class A offices acquired by investors who obtain a high 
proportion of assets tend to sell for higher prices.  This effect is strongest for investors 
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who have a high market share of eco-certified Class A office space when they acquire 
eco-certified space.  Turning to the question of the relationship between market share and 
transaction prices, the empirical results provide evidence of significant positive price 
effects of market share.  This suggests that eco- investors are creating clientele effects 
that are significant determinants of the price premiums for eco-certified office space and 
that they may be subject to a green winner’s curse.     
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Appendix 1 
Description of variables 
Independent 
variables 
 
  
Age is a binary variable set to indicate one at a given age of 
property. 
Renovated is a binary variable set to indicate one at a given number of 
years since major refurbishment. 
Sale price represents the natural logarithm of sale price psf in real terms 
Occupancy rate represents the percentage of the building that is leased 
Size represents the natural logarithm of the rentable building area 
Stories is the natural logarithm of the number of stories 
Plot size represents the natural logarithm of the area of the site on which 
building is situated 
Bank is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has a bank 
branch or ATM in the building 
Fitness center is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has a gym 
Airconditioning is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property is 
completely air-conditioned. 
Onsite manager is a binary variable set to indicate one if property manager's 
office 
Bus stop is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property is within 
walking distance of a bus stop. 
Commuter rail is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property direct 
access to or, if in the suburbs, is within reasonable walking 
distance of a commuter rail stop 
Conference 
suite 
is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has 
conference facilities 
Convenience is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has a 
convenience store  
Atrium is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has a 
lobby with a high, vaulted ceiling or a grand, central court that 
separates two halves of a large building 
Bank is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has 
banking facilities in the building 
Corner lot is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property is situated 
on corner lot 
Dry cleaner is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has dry 
cleaning facilities in the building. 
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Food services is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has a 
cafeteria facility 
Signage is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has 
exterior signage. 
Street parking is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has on 
street parking facilities  
Concierge is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has a 
lobby attendant provided by the building owner to assist tenants 
of the building with special requests. 
Subway is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property is within 
an 800m radius of a rail terminus. 
Restaurant is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has a 
restaurant in the building. 
24/7 access is a binary variable set to indicate one if the property has 
constant access. 
Eco-certified Is a binary variable set to indicate one of the property is either 
LEED or Energy Star certified 
submarket is a binary variable indicating in which of the i submarkets that 
the property is located in.  Submarkets are divisions of the 
primary market that are generally recognizable to the real estate 
industry and the business community by the names given to the 
areas.  For instance, the Manhattan market consists of 20 
submarkets.  In total, we use 545 submarkets. 
 
